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This study analyzes the competitive interactions between focal and rival firms in 
the domain of environmental management (EM) practices and the associated impacts on 
environmental performance and financial performance. Using competitive dynamics and 
institutional theory as a basis, the study contends that firm performance is impacted by 
behavior of both focal and rival firms, and perceptions of legitimacy. Our findings 
indicate that firms competing aggressively do benefit from their proactive approach, but 
significant dissimilarity of behavior from their rivals tends to negatively impact firm 
performance bringing issues of legitimacy to the forefront. 
Subsequently, the study expands the work outlined above with a larger set of 
performance measures to look at the impact of rivalry on growth and long term 
shareholder value. Furthermore, this section also looks into the joint impact of 
environmental behavior and environmental performance on financial performance via a 
mediating model using various environmental performance measures. The findings 
indicate a partial mediation between EM behavior and financial performance from EM 
reputation and EM policy. 
 
In the final part of the dissertation, the study presents exploratory work on two 
future research topics. The first topic expands the work from focal-rival dyads to include 
supplier networks as well. The second topic lays out a roadmap for future work in the 
area of credible EM signaling. This discussion dwells on issues surrounding 
greenwashing that has been reported in the popular media.  
Given the visibility on sustainable activities across the entire spectrum, and the 
burden of green on firms, it is important to understand how firms are responding and if 
the returns justify their investments. This study contributes to this discourse by tying 
theory with behavior and adds additional clarity to firm behavior vis-à-vis green. From a 
methodological perspective, this study uses an original panel dataset using secondary data 
sources, which adds to the credibility of the results. The study has important managerial 
relevance at both the firm level and for policy making.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
According to a report titled “Green Manufacturing: An Inconvenient Reality” in 
IndustryWeek, additional environmental regulations will continue to build pressure on 
manufacturers to adopt green manufacturing. As highlighted in this news piece “In 2004 
the business sector shouldered 65% of environmental regulatory costs, with 
manufacturers paying an average of $4,850 per employee, according to a 2005 U.S. 
Small Business Administration report.”  The article creates a link between regulations, 
firm activities, environmental performance, additional costs, and the need for improved 
financial performance to offset added costs. In doing so, the above article raises several 
questions of interest. Are environmental management (EM) activities helpful or harmful 
to a firm’s performance? Given that firms and their rivals are vying for the same set of 
consumers, how is green competition impacting firm performance? How are firms 
competing? Do they have support from their suppliers and does that impact their 
performance? If firms are facing real competition then are the methods of competition 
transparent or are firms leveraging the information asymmetry to disseminate false 
information to seek unfair advantage? Given that firm operations primarily support its 
green agenda, this study takes a comprehensive look at the EM domain using signals as a 
proxy for operational activity and tries to explain firm behavior in the context of 
performance,  
Several authors (Angell and Klassen, 1999; Kleindorfer et al., 2005) have 
advocated the need for integrating EM in the mainstream of operations management 
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research agenda. These studies acknowledge the action-outcome link while emphasizing 
the need for more integration with other disciplines including economics to better 
understand firm activity. Researchers have looked into sourcing, quality management, 
and other supply chain and operations management activities in the environmental 
context. King and Lenox (2001) look at the relationship between lean and green. Zhu and 
Sarkis (2004) look into the moderating effect of quality management and just-in-time 
between environmental practices and performance. Another area of interest in terms of 
green adoption by firms has been an emphasis on supplier selection. Researchers (Walton 
et al., 1998; Rao and Holt, 2005) have focused on the application of green criteria on 
supplier selection and integrating suppliers into the green objectives of the firm. 
Montabon et al., (2000) look at environmental and financial performance as a result of 
the adoption of ISO 14000. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) look at financial 
performance in relationship to announcement of EM awards. The studies cited above 
have made important contributions to the field of environmental management research in 
the context of operations management. But, as noted by Montabon et al. (2007), much of 
the research looking at green behavior of firms has focused at a small subset of EM 
activities. Additionally, the impacts of EM on performance have been mixed and are 
further confounded by the fact that the studies undertaken are typically not supported by 
an underlying theory of firm behavior. 
From a theoretical perspective, institutional viewpoints have often been used to 
explain the adoption of EM. As part of the institutional framework, policy and regulation 
driven research have been undertaken (Johnstone et al., 2010; Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011) by looking at patent filings or adoption of EM standards at the country 
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level, but this research does not provide insights into firm behavior at the operations 
level. In terms of regulations, as noted by Baylis et al. (1998), the type of regulation 
itself, for instance permit based as opposed to incident based, makes it difficult to apply 
any uniform criteria for assessing how firms internalize the impact of regulations into 
their operations. The institutional viewpoint has been partly successful in explaining the 
reason for EM adoption as a way to earn legitimacy, but it does not entirely explain the 
variance in EM adoption across firms. At the firm level, one needs to look into the 
quantum of a firm’s environmental operations and the associated impact on a firm’s 
environmental and financial performance to fully understand the EM choices being made 
by firms. 
There is a growing evidence of voluntary adoption of EM practices by firms that 
aligns with Porter’s (1991) “win-win” argument. In his exposition, the author challenged 
the traditional mindset that environmental regulations were harmful to firms; in fact he 
argued that the benefits could outweigh the costs if the regulations were properly 
structured. Porter (1991) advocated that benefits are achieved through innovation and by 
reduction and avoidance of pollution. In effect, Porter (1991) advocates a more 
competitive posture by going green. Several papers have extended Porter’s argument 
from reactive adoption of environmental practices in response to regulations to proactive 
greening as a firm strategy (Hanna and Newman, 1995; Sanchez, 1997; Berry and 
Rondinelli, 1998). Hull and Rothenberg (2008) looked into the issue of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) interactions with innovation and industry differentiation. They argue 
that corporate social performance (CSP) that includes being good stewards of the 
environment is a way for firms to differentiate and improve their financial performance, 
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especially in less innovative industries where competition through possibilities of 
innovation are lacking.  Anecdotally, there is evidence that links firms in the same market 
to actions that could be construed as competition in the green domain. For example, 
Starbucks made the first move of replacing Styrofoam cups with paper cups, which was 
followed by McDonald’s taking a similar step. More recently, Starbucks announced that 
it is introducing a one-dollar reusable cup for customers. The EM actions taken by Coca-
Cola and PepsiCo to introduce bioplastics is well documented in the trade press as the 
“bottle wars.” 
In a first, Hofer et al. (2012) blend competitive dynamics viewpoint into 
operations management to look into the issue of competitive drivers of EM. By 
leveraging theory grounded in Schumpeterian economics and signaling, they find a 
positive association between rival and firm responses in terms of the scale of competitive 
environmental activities. Using competitive dynamics as a framework, this was the first 
study that explained firm behavior as an outcome of market based rivalry.  Their study 
takes a comprehensive look at various possible EM activities, which would make up a 
firm’s EM operations, as potential areas of competition to better understand firm 
behavior. In doing so, this work greatly augmented the observations made by others (Rao, 
2002; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008) that firms do compete on the environmental dimension 
making moves and counter moves as they respond to each other to seek competitive 
advantage. Though Hofer et al. (2012) establish rivalry in the EM context, the study of 
EM rivalry in the framework of competitive dynamics is incomplete. Does EM rivalry 
impact performance? This question is central to this dissertation. 
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To seek answers to the question raised above, Chapter 2 looks at the impact of 
EM rivalry on firm performance, both environmental and financial.  Chapter 3 extends 
the work done in the second chapter to look at a richer set of measures for additional 
insights into performance. More importantly, Chapter 3 also looks at a comprehensive 
model of EM behavior, EM performance, and financial performance to test out the 
various interactions. Chapter 4 brings more focus to the work done by Hofer et al. (2012) 
by expanding the set of rivals and developing additional measures to further our 
understanding of EM rivalry. Chapter 5 extends the work to boundary spanning activities 
to assess the impact of supplier EM behavior on focal firm performance. Finally, Chapter 
6 builds out approaches for additional network level analysis, and the arguments for 
assessing credibility in the EM domain suggesting feasible approaches, to study these 
topics as part of future research beyond this dissertation. 
 
Research Contribution 
This study proposes to extend the Hofer et al. (2012) study in several different ways, 
including: 1) by looking at a larger and richer set of firm interactions in the green 
domain; 2) by looking deeper at the competitive landscape for identification of rivals to 
refine our assessment of competitor activity; 3) by looking at the performance impacts, 
both environmental and financial, of EM behavior; 4) by looking at boundary spanning 
EM behavior to include a firm’s supplier network and its impact on firm performance; 
and 5) by using secondary sources of data to add credibility to the results. In doing so the 
study makes the following key contributions: 
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1. Chapter 2 – makes a theoretical contribution via original hypothesis supported by 
existing theories. This chapter also provides the empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesized relationships between EM rivalry and firm performance, both 
environmental and financial. 
2. Chapter 3 – makes an empirical contribution via additional insights into the 
impact of signaling on environmental impact vs. environmental reputation1/policy 
putting signaling in the spotlight. This chapter also garners additional insights into 
the impact of EM rivalry on different financial performance measures. 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis in this chapter provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the different ways in which EM behavior affect financial 
performance via a mediating model of environmental performance. 
3. Chapter 4 – makes an empirical contribution through continued emphasis on 
studying rivalry in the EM domain via additional competitive dynamic measures. 
4. Chapter 5 – makes an empirical and theoretical contribution via expansion of the 
EM domain beyond firm boundaries answering the call for more research at the 
supply chain network level. 
5. Chapter 6 – this chapter outlines future research topics. It discusses approaches 
for extending the supplier network analysis. Additionally, it lays the theoretical 
foundation and feasible approaches for empirical research into the issue of 
credibility of EM signals for a more meaningful analysis of firm performance.  
 
                                                 
1 The terms environmental reputation and environmental image are used interchangeably throughout the 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Competitive Dynamics and Performance 
 
Introduction 
Environmental management practices are an important topic in the supply chain 
literature (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Gattiker and Carter, 2010; Sarkis et al., 2010; 
Hofer, Cantor, and Dai 2012).  Environmental management practices include reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, reduction in water consumption, use of renewable energy, 
reduction in solid waste, and improved land use. Increasingly, customers, employees, 
suppliers, and the general public are paying close attention to corporations’ sustainability 
and environmental management activities.  Moreover, there is evidence that firms engage 
in competitive environmental moves and counter-moves as a means to enhance their 
environmental image. For example, Starbucks made the first move of replacing 
Styrofoam cups with paper cups, which was followed by McDonald’s taking a similar 
step. More recently, Starbucks announced that it is encouraging customer owned 
tumblers as a further step to enhance its environmental image. (Wizness Community, 
2012). The actions and counteractions taken by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are also well 
documented in their race for introduction of bioplastics into their bottles (Bioplastic 
Innovations, 2012). Accordingly, it is important to consider how environmental practices 
of focal firms and rivals impact the environmental and financial performance of the firm.  
A stream of research has examined the impact of environmental management practices on 
environmental and financial performance.  Using secondary data on stock market returns, 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) find a positive association between environmental 
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management announcements and financial performance.  Montabon et al. (2000) do not 
find a conclusive link between adoption of ISO 14000 standards and overall performance 
in terms of reduced costs, reduced lead-times or improved quality, but acknowledge the 
possibility of improved competitiveness.   Montabon et al. (2007) finds that 
environmental management practices are correlated with several forms of firm 
performance.  Rao (2002) did not find a significant link between environmental 
management practices and financial performance.  Sarkis et al. (2010) find that 
environmental training practices mediate the link between stakeholder pressure and firm 
performance.  While these studies have made important contributions to the literature, 
prior research has not examined how rivalry in the environmental management practice 
domain affects both the focal firm’s environmental image and firm financial 
performance.  This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
The purpose of this study is to build and test theory regarding how rivalry in 
environmental management activity affects a focal firm’s environmental and overall firm 
performance. Specifically, the research questions in this study are: Does a focal and rival 
firm’s environmental management signals impact a focal firm’s environmental and firm 
financial performance? Does the dissimilarity between a focal and rival firm’s 
environmental management signals impact a focal firm’s environmental and financial 
performance? In addressing these questions, this study contributes to previous 
environmental management literature discussed above, and also extends the work of 
Hofer et al. (2012) by assessing the impact of firm EM rivalry on firm performance. This 
study makes several contributions to the supply chain literature.  Importantly, the study 
builds theory with regard to how signals of competitive environmental management 
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activity among a focal firm and its rivals affect environmental and financial performance.  
This study leverages competitive dynamics and institutional theory to explain how a focal 
firm is motivated to improve its environmental and overall financial performance.  The 
theory is tested with an original, multi-year data set of 3,224 focal-rival dyad pairs.  
Measures of EM signals are developed from content analysis of corporate sustainability 
reports, which is responsive to the call for the use of innovative data sources in OM by 
Boyer and Swink (2008).  An environmental performance measure, specifically 
environmental image, is drawn from the Newsweek US 500 Green Rankings data, with 
firm financial data drawn from Compustat.  We next turn to the development of the 
theoretical model.    
 
Theory background and hypotheses development 
Competitive Dynamics Theoretical Perspective 
Competitive dynamics is one of the theoretical frameworks for this study (Grimm 
and Smith, 1997; Grimm et al., 2006). Grounded in Schumpeterian economics 
(Schumpeter, 1934), competitive dynamics posits that firms operate in dynamic market 
environments where firms and their rivals constantly engage in competitive actions.   
Within the competitive dynamics perspective, a competitive action is defined as “a 
specific and observable competitive move, such as a new product introduction, 
advertising campaign, or price cut, initiated by a firm to improve or defend its relative 
competitive position.” (Grimm, et al., 2006, p. 87)  A central premise of competitive 
dynamics is that the outcome of firm and rival competitive actions is the key to 
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competitive advantage.  (Grimm and Smith, 1997; Young et al., 1996; Grimm et al., 
2006).  Beginning with Smith et al. (1991), the competitive dynamics perspective has 
relied on structured content analysis of business press to document actual competitive 
moves and countermoves and to assess their impact on firm performance. In recent years, 
the competitive dynamics perspective has continued to evolve within the strategy field.  
In applying the competitive dynamics perspective here, we will focus on firm and 
rival competitive signals in lieu of competitive actions reported in the business press, this 
study measures firm signals as reported by the firm through corporate sustainability 
(CSR) reports.  Prior research in competitive dynamics focusses on market actions as 
observed by a third party usually reported in the trade press. In our study, a competitive 
signal includes actions as well as announcement of intended actions. Furthermore, the 
competitive signaling is by the firm itself rather than observations made by an 
independent third party. This approach finds support in Porter’s (1980) definition of 
market signals stating: 'A market signal is any action by a competitor that provides a 
direct or indirect indication of its intentions, motives, goals, or internal situation' (p.75). 
As noted by Heil and Robertson (1991), the definition includes both market actions 
themselves as well as preannouncements of market actions. This allows us to use the 
content published in CSR reports that record both accomplishments and intent in terms of 
potential actions by the firm in the EM domain.  CSR reports record actions, such as, the 
establishment of a solar power generation facility (Agilent, 2009), as well as intent, for 
example, Michelin’s commitment to reach a 100% recovery rate of used tires within a 
certain timeframe. In terms of third party observation as opposed to the firm itself 
sending out signals, we leverage the arguments around the signal sender (Heil and 
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Robertson, 1991; Stiglitz, 2000) to find support for this approach. As noted by Stiglitz 
(2000), firms employ various means to convey their capabilities and we accept CSR 
reports as a mechanism for firms to convey information on their green capabilities. The 
above argument is also support by Heil and Robertson (1991) who anchor a competitive 
signal from a sender’s perspective with the objective of conveying or gaining information 
from the signal. Together the above arguments support that competitive signaling can be 
achieved through firm disclosures in CSR reports. 
 
Institutional Theory Perspective 
The second overarching theory for our model is institutional theory.  According to 
institutional theorists, a firm’s strategy is affected by the social, political, and economic 
forces that exist in the organization’s external environment (North, 1986).  Because a 
variety of industries experience a constant flux of change relative to social values, 
technological advancements, and regulations, the firm is motivated to demonstrate how 
their products and services match the needs of the external environment.  Thus firms are 
constantly attempting to demonstrate how their organization provides value to the key 
stakeholder in their respective industries.  Stated differently, institutional theory helps to 
explain how firms have a desire to demonstrate legitimacy in their respective markets. 
Related to our study, Delmas and Toffel (2008) examine how firms attempt to 
demonstrate legitimacy concerning compliance with environmental regulations by 
adopting standards and environmental practices in the firm’s manufacturing facilities. 
Thus Delmas and Toffel (2008) and Powell and DiMaggio (1991) highlight the 
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importance of the legitimacy of signals that are conveyed by the competitive actions of 
firms and their rivals in the environmental domain. 
Institutional theorists also point out that firms send signals of their competitive 
intentions and undertake competitive actions as a way to respond to the normative 
pressure that they experience. Firms seek to conform to several norms that are preferred 
and desirable, including fair and acceptable business practices. Firms are facing increased 
public scrutiny to engage in sustainable actions.  In fact, Bansal and Clelland (2004) 
argue that firms face normative pressures to demonstrate that the firm is legitimately 
engaged in green behavior in order satisfy the desires of eco-friendly key stakeholders. 
As noted by Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013), media reports and by extension reports in the 
media help to send signals that the firm is attempting to comply with stakeholder desires 
which should help enhance the image of the firm and create a certain perception of the 
firm’s legitimacy.  
The resulting research model developed from the theoretical underpinnings of 
competitive dynamics and institutional theory are outlined in Figure 1. The hypothesized 




Figure 1 – Signaling – Performance model 
 
Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis examines the link between environmental management 
signals from the focal firm and its environmental image.  Drawing on Berg (1985), Gioia 
et al. (2000) define environmental image as “the public's perception or impression of an 
organization, usually associated with a given action or event.” These external perceptions 
are formed based on what is disclosed of and by the firm. Furthermore, as argued by 
Gioia et al. (2000), image is a representation of a firm’s adaptation to changing 
requirements to help reconcile the central and enduring identity of the organization with 
the changing environment. For example, the central identity of Apple could be a maker of 
innovative devices, but their attempts to adapt green practices would lend Apple to have 
a green image to go along with the identity of an innovative device maker. Given green is 
a new requirement that firms are trying to fulfill without changing their core business, 
Rival Signaling 
Firm Performance 
(Image & ROA) 
H1, H2: +
H3, H4: - 
Signaling 
Dissimilarity 
H5a, b: - 
Firm Signaling 
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image as an external perception forms an appropriate measure of environmental 
performance to assess the impact of green signaling.  
The competitive dynamics perspective provides a basis for the link between 
environmental signals and performance.  Central to the competitive dynamics perspective 
is the need for firms to act for securing competitive advantages (Grimm et al, 2006). 
Continuous firm activity to improve market position draws from Schumpeter (1934) and 
is explained in terms of the need to recreate competitive advantage. As explained by 
Young et al. (1996) market actions by a firm (1) is an essential process in free markets, 
(2) helps break the competitive status quo to establish new performance relationships, 
and (3) can help firms discover new opportunities. All of the above is applicable to green 
initiatives in terms of establishing new product lines, or providing a new dimension for 
competition (Hull and Rothenburg, 2008). 
To establish the competitive dynamics link with environmental image, we 
leverage Grunig’s (1993) explanation of an image as something a firm tries to create, 
construct, or project to other people via a messages or signals by the firm. The 
explanation allows us to create the link between messages or signals by the firm using 
CSR reports and the resultant image. The competitive dynamics of the process of image 
creation has been elaborated in the context of a stakeholder’s cognitive capabilities 
(Basdeo et al., 2006). Similar to the arguments presented by Basdeo et al, (2006), signals 
that include market actions and preannouncements are observable and convey 
information about the firm’s strategy, intent, position, and capabilities. Furthermore, the 
firm’s signals indicate the resources available to the firm to follow through on market 
actions. They also indicate the ability of the firm to create value for the stakeholders. By 
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conveying the unobservable information about the firm or intent of the firm via signals 
conveyed through multiple market actions, a firm competes to enhance its image for 
improved positioning in the market.  
In our study, signals of environmental management activities through CSR reports 
fulfill a similar role as the communication of the firm’s environmental efforts and is 
observable through publicly accessible corporate sustainability reports.  These 
environmental reports convey the intent of the firm’s environmental strategy, which is a 
central tenet of past competitive dynamics research (Smith and Grimm, 1991).  
Therefore, through the firm’s environmental management signals reported via CSRs, a 
firm tries to construct or project a positive environmental image in the market place.  
Given the aforementioned arguments, we contend that environmental signaling 
efforts should have a positive impact on the environmental image of the firm. Thus, this 
study merges observations from Heil and Robertson (1991), i.e., both actions and 
preannouncements act as signals from the sender, with the extant research in competitive 
dynamics that has found firm behavior, as observed via signals, to be a significant 
determinant of firm performance to formally propose: 
 
H1: Higher levels of environmental signaling by a focal firm will have a positive effect on 
the environmental image of the focal firm. 
 
Our second hypothesis examines the link between focal firm signals and financial 
performance. Drawing from Ferrier et al. (1999), the arguments for improved financial 
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performance as a result of firm actions is explained in the basis of those actions as 
undertaken to enhance firm profitability. Furthermore, aggressive actions by a firm 
results in greater exploitation of new opportunities by making them unavailable to rivals. 
Continuous actions also helps firm create unique assets in terms of knowhow, lowering 
the cost of future actions through increased efficiency from learning through past actions, 
greater attraction for more qualified employees, greater attraction for suppliers and 
partners, all of which would improve the firm’s market position. 
Prior competitive dynamics research has examined the extent to which a firm’s 
competitive actions impact firm performance (Smith et al., 1991; Young et al., 1996; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Grimm et al., 2006; Basdeo et al., 2006).  This body of research has 
operationalized firm actions in different ways including scale of actions, scope of actions, 
actions similarity and speed of actions (Young et al., 1996; Basdeo et al., 2006; Derfus et 
al., 2008). While Young et al. (1996) find a positive association between competitive 
actions and performance, Derfus et al. (2008) find that market-leading firms need to 
engage in a constant flurry of actions in order stay ahead of rivals since the speed of 
actions is repeatedly being matched by rival firms. This stream of research has 
established that firms which engage in competitive moves and counter-moves achieve 
stronger market position and improved financial performance. 
In the space of environmental management, the specific attributes of firm actions 
that lead to improved financial performance has been outlined by Porter (1991). He 
advocated that the adoption of environmental initiatives led to greater efficiencies and 
enhanced revenue streams. These arguments based on competitive dynamics have also 
been supported by others (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; King and Lenox, 2001) who 
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map out the ways in which environmental initiatives could positively impact the firm 
performance. Market share gains and higher product margins are often cited as outcomes 
of going green for increased revenues. Similarly, avoidance of penalties, reduced material 
consumption, reduced waste, increased attraction and hiring of better performers are 
often cited as mechanism for increased efficiency.  Through environmental signaling, a 
firm is highlighting both its accomplishments as well as making its intentions known 
about the future course of green initiatives. As such, the signals link to both paths of 
improved financial performance by realizing efficiencies through accomplishments noted 
in the signals as well as higher revenue streams based on the ability to generate higher 
product margins, increase market share, establish new markets etc., with  current or 
intended actions. 
Given the aforementioned arguments, we contend that to establish a stronger 
positive link between environmental management signals and firm financial performance, 
the firm needs to send a constant flurry of environmental signals to the market. We 
present the following hypothesis. 
 
H2: Higher levels of environmental signaling by focal firm will have a positive 
effect on the financial performance of the focal firm. 
 
Our next set of hypotheses (H3 and H4) examines the extent to which a 
competitor’s environmental signals will have an adverse impact on focal firm 
performance, both environmental image and financial performance.  A central 
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characteristic of competitive dynamics looks at the interplay between competing firms. In 
a competitive market, firms are interdependent and actions taken by a firm impact their 
rivals who therefore make reactionary or counter moves either through mimicry or 
otherwise to erode the gains made by the firm initiating competitive actions (Grimm et 
al., 2006). This sequence of actions and reactions by firms and their rivals sets the 
competitive context and impacts performance. The increase in rival activity eroding focal 
firm advantages follows similar logic in terms of creation of unique assets, exploitation of 
new areas, attracting better talent, gaining consumers etc. 
In the EM signaling context, CSRs include reporting on green products or 
processes to provide the stakeholders with insights into the firm’s overall green posture 
and current state. We contend that the higher levels of EM signaling is to create a greener 
image vis-à-vis its rivals by seeking positive attention through the signaling effort. The 
impact on image as a result of higher levels of signaling can be explained by the 
substitutive effect (Basdeo et al., 2006). A substitutive effect is realized when a firm and 
its rivals compete for the same stakeholder attention. Rival signaling therefore garners 
attention at the expense of the focal firm thereby diminishing the importance of focal firm 
signals resulting in a loss of image. In addition to the substitutive effect, rival signaling 
might also provide greater insights into the viability of focal firm signals. Rival signaling 
could potentially highlight the competitive situation in the industry bringing into focus 
resources required by the focal firm to compete and thereby raising doubts about their 
strategy. In essence, the firm that is more successful in communicating its value 
proposition will end-up becoming the market leader.  Through higher levels of EM 
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signaling, rival firms may become more successful compared to the focal firm in terms of 
successfully improving their environmental image.  
Given the aforementioned arguments accounting for a substitutive effect, it is 
hypothesized that a firm improves its environmental image at the expense of its rival. 
Leveraging the competitive dynamics arguments, we present the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Higher levels of environmental signaling by rivals will have a negative impact on the 
environmental image of the focal firm. 
 
The arguments for a negative impact of rival signaling on focal firm performance 
is grounded in Porter’s (1980) viewpoint of competition. This argument is based on the 
notion that competition is a zero sum game (Porter 1980) and gains are made by a firm at 
the expense of their rival. The mechanism for eroding the financial gains of a rival have 
already been elaborated in earlier discussions. Prior research has leveraged the 
competitive context to study the types of competitive moves, the resultant counter moves, 
and overall impact on firm financial performance (Grimm and Smith 1997; Young et al., 
1996; Grimm et al., 2006). As noted by Ferrier et al. (1999), competitive moves could 
include new promotional strategies, or cultivation of an upscale market segment to gain 
new customers. Given the interdependencies and the impact of focal firm actions such as 
loss of market share, rivals react with counter moves by the focal firm to prevent a focal 
firm from gaining a competitive advantage. Competitive dynamics studies have found 
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that competitive actions undertaken by rivals diminishes the competitive advantage 
accrued to a focal firm (Young et al., 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; Basdeo et al., 2006).   
 Given the aforementioned arguments accounting for a zero-sum game, it is 
hypothesized that for financial performance a firm improves its performance at the 
expense of its rival. Leveraging the competitive dynamics arguments, we present the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Higher levels of environmental signaling by rivals will have a negative effect on the 
financial performance of the focal firm. 
 
We now turn to describing how the dissimilarity between a firm’s environmental 
signals and its competitors negatively affects a focal firm’s performance, both 
environmental image and financial performance.  In so doing, we draw-upon the 
legitimacy aspects of institutional theory.  To gain or maintain the perception of 
legitimacy of its key stakeholders, the firm sends environmental signals to the market that 
its environmental activities are similar in nature to its rivals.  Basdeo et al., (2006) find 
that similarity in the repertoire of actions (marketing, pricing, legal actions etc.) 
positively impacts focal firm reputation. Although firms try to differentiate themselves by 
distinguishing their actions from competitors, depending on the nature of the industry 
competition, some strategy scholars argue that firms should engage in competitive actions 
that conform to industry norms and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Similarity of actions 
contributes to the institutionalization process and reaps positive benefits from doing so. 
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Conversely, dissimilar actions by focal or rival would in fact harm the dynamics of the 
industry when the firm departs from established norms and beliefs. For example, if firms 
within the industry place a strong value on ISO 14001 certification but the focal firm 
itself is more interested in creating green products with little regard to the certification 
process surrounding the manufacturing and distribution of products, the firm could be 
perceived as deviating from the industry’s values and thus damages its own as well as the 
industry’ standing. The importance of having firms that conform to industry norms and 
beliefs is further evident in industries that face higher levels of regulatory pressures.  
While non-conformity helps with performance in dynamic and less regulated markets, 
Norman et al. (2007) find that firms not conforming to key stakeholder requirements 
exhibit poorer performance when regulations exist. Therefore, we contend that the focal 
firm environmental reputation or image is harmed when there is a high level of 
dissimilarity in signals between focal and rival. While similarity in signals will have an 
overall positive effect on the focal firm’s environmental image, a high level of 
environmental signal dissimilarity would lead to legitimacy concerns and thus negatively 
affect the focal firm’s environmental image.  
Similar to the impact on environmental image, the impact of environmental signal 
dissimilarity is hypothesized to have an adverse impact on focal firm financial 
performance. The argument for an adverse impact is also grounded in the institutional 
perspective of legitimacy.  As argued by Bansal and Clelland (2004), legitimacy plays an 
important role in a firm’s stock price performance as a reaction to an adverse event forms 
a stakeholder’s perception of the firm. The legitimacy perspective is further qualified by 
Doh et al. (2010) who find that institutional intermediaries play an important legitimacy-
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conferring function. Given the difficulty of separating environmental claims from actual 
actions, the authors argue that stakeholders rely on the institutional intermediaries to 
evaluate a firm’s corporate social responsibility, which then impacts firm performance. 
This is especially true in the environmental management domain where the role of 
institutional intermediaries has resulted in the creation of various institutions such as 
Public Environmental Reporting Initiative (PERI), Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economics (CERES), the ICC Business Charter for Sustainable 
Development (ICC), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) with their respective set of 
evaluation standards. As noted by Jose and Lee (2006), with issues of sustainability 
becoming a prominent concern to stakeholders, firms have tried to institutionalize 
environmental management concerns through policies, procedures, and system, and these 
are now reflected in the use of reporting frameworks such as GRI. In essence, there is a 
push for conformity as witnessed by the proliferation of environmental management 
reporting frameworks and the creation of non-governmental organizations. This 
viewpoint is bolstered by Norman et al. (2007) in their advocacy of conformity in firm 
actions in regulation driven industries. 
Given the above, we offer the following:  
 
H5a: Higher levels of focal and rival signaling dissimilarity will have a negative impact 
on the environmental image of the focal firm. 
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H5b: Higher levels of focal and rival signaling dissimilarity will have a negative effect on 
the financial performance of the focal firm.  
 
Sample, data, and variables 
Sample 
This study examines the relationship between environmental signaling and both 
the environmental image and financial performance of a focal firm.  The empirical 
analysis focuses on US publicly traded companies that appeared in the Newsweek US 500 
Green Rankings data, which was first published in 2009.  A review of various 
environmental performance databases conducted by Rahman and Post (2012) indicates 
that the Newsweek US 500 Green Rankings data is a viable data source and has been used 
in prior empirical research (e.g., Aaron et al., 2012; Wilcox et al., 2014). Hence, the 
Newsweek dataset, comprising 2,000 firm-year level data points for 582 unique firms 
between 2009 and 2012, defines the sampling frame for the current study. 
For each of the firms listed in the Newsweek rankings, a focal firm’s rivals were 
identified using company profiles published in Hoover’s, a Dunn and Bradstreet 
database, which profiles publicly traded companies and lists up to three of the key 
competitors for each firm. Hoover’s has previously been used in academic research to 
identify competitors (Aktas et al., 2007). In an effort to verify the identification of rivals, 
spot checks were performed using Compustat to determine the largest firms by sales 
within the same six-digit NAICS industry. A high degree of overlap was found between 
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the sets of rivals identified via Compustat and Hoover’s. This process yielded a set of 
5,833 dyadic focal firm-rival observations. 
In a next step, corporate sustainability reports (CSR) were collected for each focal 
and rival firm for the 2008 to 2011 time period, reflecting a one-year lag relative to the 
available Newsweek environmental performance measures. A one-year lag was also 
employed in Hofer et al. (2012).  CSR reports, available for download on company 
websites or aggregator sites such as Responsibilityreports.com, have been used in prior 
studies to examine firm-level environmental activity (Montabon et al., 2007; Tate et al., 
2010; Hofer et al., 2012). CSR reporting is voluntary such that reports were not available 
for all firms in all years. Focal firm-rival observations were excluded from further 
analysis in those instances where neither company had published a CSR report. This 
sample selection process resulted in an unbalanced panel data set comprising 3,224 focal-
rival dyad pairs spread over four years.  
 
Measurement of variables  
Dependent variables 
There are two dependent variables of interest in this study: a focal firm’s 
environmental image and its financial performance. The focal firm’s environmental 
image measures are derived from the 2009 through 2012 Newsweek US 500 Green 
Ranking data which is based on a third party’s external assessment of the firm’s 
environmental performance.  The focal firm’s environmental image in 2009 and 2010 
was operationalized as the firm’s opinion based survey score, derived from the Newsweek 
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green database. In 2011 and 2012, a focal firm’s environmental image was 
operationalized as a firm’s environmental disclosure score.  The environmental disclosure 
score is based on a third-party evaluation of the breadth and quality of focal firm’s 
reporting of environmental material impact and accounts for a firm’s participation in 
reporting initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP). The environmental disclosure score is assessed by an independent third 
party, Trucost. Because Newsweek adjusted their green reporting methodology across the 
years of our sample, the scores are standardized. A positive and significant correlation 
value of 0.42 between 2010 and 2011 standardized scores for overlapping firms confirms 
the validity of this approach. 
Because this study also examines the relationship between environmental 
signaling and a focal firm’s financial performance, we now turn to defining how we 
operationalized firm financial performance. A focal firm’s financial performance is 
operationalized as its return on assets (ROA), i.e., the ratio of net income and total assets. 
This measure is consistent with our argument that the impact of environmental signals 
can result in efficiency or revenue gains. The firm financial data was derived from the 
Compustat database across the years 2009 through 2012.   
 
Independent variables 
We now turn to describing our three key independent variables in this study, 
namely, focal firm environmental signaling, rival firm environmental signaling, and the 
dissimilarity in environmental signaling between focal and rival firms. These measures 
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are derived from the firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) report. In so doing, we 
operationalized these measures using structured content analysis of the firm’s CSR 
reports through the use of Crawdad software (Hofer et al. 2012; Tate et al. 2010).  As 
described in Hofer et al. (2012), Crawdad software employs centering resonance analysis 
(CRA) to quantitatively assess the prevalence and relative importance of the most 
influential keywords from an archival document. To analyze the set of reports collected 
for creating the signaling measures, the following steps were undertaken. 
First, in line with prior research (Tate et al., 2010; Hofer et al., 2012), the 
Crawdad software package was used to identify the 250 most influential keywords from 
the entire set of CSR reports. Corman and Dooley (2006) note that positive correlations 
between such keywords indicate that these terms tend to co-occur in an archival 
document and allow researchers to make inferences about the prevalence of a given 
theme. For example, the positive correlation between the keywords “waste” and 
“reduction” indicates that “waste reduction” is a relevant theme, and its prevalence in a 
given report can be assessed via the associated influence scores provided by the Crawdad 
software.  
In the second step, relevant environmental management (EM) themes are 
identified using keyword combinations from the 250x250 keyword matrix generated in 
the first step. In this study, all positively correlated keyword combinations occurring in 
the 250x250 keywords matrix from step 1 are matched against the list of keyword 
combinations or themes that were classified as EM themes in the Hofer et al. (2012) 
study, which leveraged the Montabon et al. (2007) typology of EM activities. The net 
result from this step was the identification of 107 relevant EM themes in the entire set of 
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reports collected for the purposes of this study. The set of 107 themes establish the range 
of EM signals and ties back to Montabon et al (2007) EM typology. For example, some 
of the commonly occurring themes across the entire set of reports are “environmental 
management”, “environmental system”, “energy sustainability”, “energy waste”, 
“product waste” etc. 
In the final step, relevant themes by individual report are used for creating a total 
signal count for a particular firm-year. Each of the 107 keyword combinations or themes 
are matched for that pair of keywords to identify the influence score provided via 
centering resonance analysis for each of the keywords in the combination. For each 
report, if the individual keyword influence scores in the pair exceeds the value of .01 
(considered significant as per guidance for using Crawdad), the theme is included in the 
total count otherwise left out. The total count of themes for both focal and rivals are 
reported as the Focal Signaling and Rival Signaling measures respectively specific to the 
firm and year. Appendix A provides additional details on the methodology for 
quantifying EM signals. 
For creating the Signaling Dissimilarity measure, we look at the category of 
membership for each of the 107 themes to assess the difference in the emphasis of the 
signals by category between a focal and its rival. Montabon et al. (2007) typology 
categorizes EM activities by operational, tactical, and strategic. Operational category is 
focused on internal operations such as the recycling processes. Strategic category lists 
activities around long term vision, corporate policies etc. Tactical deals with activities 
such as involvement of suppliers in product design, supplier auditing etc. Each of the 
environmental management themes are also mapped to one of these categories.  
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The measure of Signaling Dissimilarity between a focal firm’s and its rival’s 
environmental signaling was generated following the approach defined by Nodofor et al. 
(2012). Specifically, Signaling Dissimilarity = 
i
ii CP
2)][( , where Pi is the proportion 
of signals in category i for the focal firm and Ci is proportion of signals in category i for 
the rival firm.  
 
Control variables 
We now describe several control variables that are included in the model.  All 
control variables are derived from the Compustat database unless otherwise noted for the 
time period of 2009 to 2012.  First, we control for the size of the firm.  Firm size is 
measured as the sales of focal firm. The argument is supported from a competitive 
dynamics viewpoint, as in, larger firms have more flexibility to undertake competitive 
actions (Young et al, 1996). Next, we also measure the focal firm’s profitability as 
measured by return on assets (ROA).  The selection of profitability as a control variable 
finds support in more profitable firms have the slack resources to make investments into 
competitive actions (Hofer et al., 2012).  Lastly, consistent with prior competitive 
dynamics research, we control for market concentration.  Firm signals are likely to be 
more effective in concentrated industries as compared to less concentrated industries.  In 
more concentrated industries, there is less competition among firms that are sending the 
signals thus the signals are more likely to be attended to among key stakeholders (Basdeo 
et al. 2006). Our market concentration is measure is derived from the Hoberg and Phillips 
(2014) dataset. The authors use text based parsing of product descriptions in 10-K annual 
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filings to determine firm similarity by products. Concentration measures are then 
calculated from sales data using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann sum of squared market 
shares formulation by including firms that exceed a certain threshold of similarity in their 
product descriptions. Due to skewness and kurtosis issues, both firm size and market 
concentration are logged in the model. Descriptive statistics for the different variables is 
provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for the performance data set 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, the average firm in our sample had $26,900 million in annual sales 
and operates in a fairly competitive market (mean market concentration = 1530). 
Transformed variables are used for generating the correlations as reported in Table 2. As 
noted earlier, we take the logarithm of sales and market concentration, and use a 
standardized score for environmental image. There are no serious multicollinearity 
concerns based on reported correlations in Table 2.  
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Table 2 – Correlation table for the performance data set 
 
 
Empirical analysis and results 
Estimation methodology 
A generalized estimating equation (GEE) methodology is employed to estimate the 
parameters of the regression model. The GEE technique is particularly suitable for the 
analysis of panel data with serially and cross-sectionally correlated observations (Liang 
and Zeger, 1986; Ballinger, 2004). In our data set, the temporal dimension is modeled as 
a first-order autoregressive process, where the value of a dependent variable in a given 
year is a function of its value in the immediately preceding year. The cross-sectional 
dimension of the data is defined by focal firm-rival pairs. It is noteworthy that the GEE 
method produces consistent estimates even when the covariance structure is misspecified 




The results from the GEE analysis for the environmental performance model as 
well as the financial performance model are summarized in Table 3.  
Environmental performance - Image 
Hypothesis 1 states that greater firm signaling results in better environmental 
image.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient of Focal Signaling lagged 
variable (β = 0.006, p ≤ 0.05) provides evidence in support of this hypothesis. Hypothesis 
3, which states that the rival’s signaling will negatively impact the focal firm 
environmental image is also supported. The coefficient estimate of Rival Signaling is 
negative (β = - 0.010) and significant at p ≤ 0.05 as reported in Table 3. Hypothesis 5a 
states that dissimilarity in signaling between focal and rival would result in a negative 
impact on focal firm’s image. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
Signaling Dissimilarity (β = -0.076, p ≤ 0.05) supports this hypothesis. Thus, there is 
evidence that firm signaling helps establish a firm’s image as long as there is an aspect of 
legitimacy to the signals, which can be disturbed by either focal or rival depending how 
far apart they are in their signaling strategies. 
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2Table 3 – Results for Image and ROA model 
 
 
Financial performance – ROA 
Hypothesis 2 states that higher levels of environmental signaling will have a 
positive impact on a firm’s financial performance. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the Focal Signaling (β = 0.057, p ≤ 0.05) provides evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 states that a higher level of rival signaling will 
                                                 
2 These results have been generated with help from Dr. Christian Hofer and Dr. David Cantor. While the 
results in all other chapters were generated in R, these results were generated in STATA due to a higher 
comfort level with STATA on the team. 
 33
have a negative impact on focal firm performance as argued from the basis of competitive 
dynamics. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the Rival Signaling (β = 
0.064, p ≤ 0.05) provides contrary support to the hypothesis. Finally, Hypothesis 5b states 
that signaling dissimilarity should adversely impact focal firm financial performance, but 
the lack of evidence of Signaling Dissimilarity as reported in Table 3 does not support 
this hypothesis. 
As a robustness check, a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model is also 
run to test the hypothesized relationships. If the model is only accounting for individual 
effects, the general FGLS framework allows the error covariance structure within a group 
to be fully unrestricted (Wooldridge, 2002). This allows for robustness against any type 
of intragroup heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. While only the GEE results are 
presented and discussed, it is to be noted that the FGLS estimation results are similar in 
terms of signs and overall significance of variables in both the environmental 
performance and financial performance model. 
Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact on performance of 
environmental signaling undertaken by a firm and its rivals. The study further embeds the 
research agenda in the theoretical context of competitive dynamics with further 
grounding from the institutional viewpoint. It advances the Hofer et al. (2012) study by 
extending the findings of firm-rival interactions to assess its impact on performance. In 
doing so, the study furthers EM research in a natural market setting. 
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Prior survey based approaches to studying the impact of EM initiatives on 
performance, though insightful, lacks the appropriate theoretical basis for explaining firm 
behavior. While theoretical approaches from institutional and stakeholder perspectives 
have been leveraged, they do not completely explain the variances in firm reactions to 
external pressures. Coupled with the prior Hofer et al. (2012) study, this research 
provides a comprehensive explanation of firm behavior in the EM domain and its impact 
on performance. Furthermore, panel data estimation using archival data sources adds 
credibility to the findings.  
 In line with prior research outcomes in competitive dynamics, the study finds a 
positive and significant impact of focal firm signaling on focal firm performance, both 
environmental image and financial performance. While the effect of rival signaling on 
image supports the competitive dynamics viewpoint, the positive impact of rival 
signaling on focal firm financial performance is surprising. The impact of dissimilarity 
supports the institutional viewpoint, which differentiates the research in the 
environmental domain from a traditional competitive dynamics setting. 
 The positive impact of competitor signaling on focal firm financial performance 
though surprising could be due to the nature of the green market and the institution of 
green. First, environmental management activities present new market opportunities for 
the focal firm and its competitors.  In so doing, pursuit of environmental management 
activities might lead to increasing the size of the environmental product and service 
market (e.g., creation of new revenue streams). As such, investment into environmental 
management activities is analogous to a “Blue Ocean” strategy (Kim and Mauborgne, 
2005). Assuming environmental behavior increases overall environmental demand, then 
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as noted by Derfus et al. (2008), competitor actions will not affect a firm as it continues 
to increase its own revenue with an expanding market. 
A related argument is that environmental management activity by focal and rival 
firms increases the environmental legitimacy of multiple industry participants.  In so 
doing, environmental signals are an enactment of a new set of social rules for acceptance 
that result in orderly, stable, socially integrated practices as advocated from an 
institutional perspective (Handelman and Arnold, 1999). Within such socially constructed 
norms, such as environmental management behavior, organizational theorists have 
argued that legitimation is achieved by others via actions that mimic these norms 
(Handelman and Arnold, 1999) resulting in a strengthening of the institution. The 
institutional benefits are examined by Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013). The authors look at the 
increased perceived legitimacy of female CEOs through positive stock market reactions 
as new female CEO’s are appointed at another firm enhancing the legitimacy of the 
institution of female CEOs. A similar argument can be extended to the institution of 
environmental management and the actions undertaken by firms and competitors in the 
legitimation process. Stated otherwise, competitive actions might actually add legitimacy 
to a firm’s actions and thus in this case environmental management pursuits by rivals 
creates an “uplift” to the focal firm’s performance. 
To gain further insights into the impact of rival signaling on focal firm financial 
performance, we conduct additional analysis for the three separate signaling categories 
namely: operational, tactical, and strategic. Table 4 summarizes results from GEE 
analysis with operational signaling. Table 5 summarizes results from GEE analysis with 
tactical signaling. Table 6 summarizes results from GEE analysis with strategic signaling.  
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Table 6 – Impact of Strategic Signaling 
 
 
While operational and tactical signaling by rivals continue to have a positive and 
significant relationship with focal firm financial performance, strategic level rival 
signaling has a negative and significant impact on focal financial performance. These 
results suggest that the institutional effect is dominant with green initiatives possibly 
improving the performance of the institution. In so doing, both focal and rival firms 
benefit from such improvements. For example, a common green supplier base might 
positively impact both focal and rival firms. Whereas the operational and tactical 
 39
signaling supports the institutional viewpoint, the impact of strategic signaling continues 
to provide support for the competitive dynamics viewpoint. At the strategic level, 
initiatives such as integration with suppliers result in competitive advantages, which are 
then challenged by rival moves to change the status quo. 
Focusing on the operational aspects of EM signaling to increase the tie with 
sustainable research in operations management, we do obtain identical results in terms of 
direction and significance by solely focusing on operational signals. As classified by 
Montabon et al.  (2007), operational initiatives are limited to initiatives within firm 
boundaries such as waste management, recycling etc. While the impact of focal and rival 
signaling in this category support the competitive dynamic viewpoint for image, the 
impact of rival operational signaling on focal financial performance supports the 
institutional viewpoint as explained earlier. 
While this study builds significantly on the earlier study by Hofer et al. (2012) by 
laying down competitive dynamics as the theoretical framework for studying EM 
behavior and performance, there are some areas of concern that can be addressed in 
future efforts. Though the study does not suffer from common method bias, it does rely 
on CSR reports that is based on voluntary reporting and might lead to missing data issues. 
Furthermore, the methodology ignores any relative importance of signals and by proxy, 
activities. For example, a significant theme of recycling-policy is accorded the same 
weightage as an environmental-award or an ISO 14000-certification. More work is 
needed to parse out these signals to assess their credibility for studying issues such as 
greenwashing commonly reported in the EM literature. Finally, even with the current 
extension, the research stream leveraging competitive dynamics is restricted to looking at 
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firm behavior and rivalry within the boundaries of the firms. Though the firm’s actions is 
an important contributor to its performance, large firms rely extensively on suppliers. As 
such, it is not just the individual firm, but suppliers as well who contribute to 
performance. As stated by Rice and Hoppe (2001): 
“The conventional wisdom is that competition in the future will not be company vs. 
company but supply chain vs. supply chain. But the reality is that instances of head-to-
head supply chain competition will be limited. The more likely scenario will find 
companies competing— and winning—based on the capabilities they can assemble 
across their supply networks.” 
 
Therefore, it is important to assess the green behavior of a firm and its suppliers in 
assessing rivalry and its impact on performance. 
 
Managerial implications 
From a managerial perspective, the study sheds light on how to react to rival 
moves in the EM domain. It is important to note that firms need to respond to rival moves 
to keep their image intact in the market. But the reactionary moves need to be nuanced. 
As evidenced in the analysis, radical moves hurt rather than help a firm. Given the 
sensitivity of green, radically different moves tend to be less believable and seem to lack 
legitimacy thereby hurting the firm’s image. Furthermore, it seems that green is a growth 
market and competitor moves does not seem to hurt a firm financially. This provides 
additional flexibility for a firm to plan its reactions to competitor moves. The “uplift” 
from competitor moves suggest a common good arising out of activities in the EM 
domain allowing firms to incrementally build their EM base within the industry. 
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This study also has relevance from a policy perspective. As opposed to 
approaching the issues of greening from a regulatory framework, this study looks at how 
firms are adopting green initiatives in a natural market setting. The chances of success of 
environmentally responsible or sustainable behavior is probably higher when the market 
rewards this behavior. 
 
Conclusion  
This study looks at the effect of environmental signaling on firm performance in the 
context of competitive dynamics with additional support from the institutional viewpoint. 
Prior research into environmental performance as a consequence of environmental 
initiatives (Montabon et al., 2000; Sroufe, 2003; Zhu and Sarkis, 2004) have been largely 
restricted to survey based studies without sufficient theoretical grounding. While the 
studies do establish improvements in operational performance as a consequence of 
environmental initiatives, common method bias remains a concern given the 
methodology employed in these studies. In looking at performance, both environmental 
and financial, using secondary data, this study largely eliminates some of the 
methodological issues of concern associated with prior studies. Furthermore, the 
theoretical grounding adds clarity to the empirical observations of the effect of focal 
signaling, competitor signaling, and signaling dissimilarity and their effect on 
performance. 
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Chapter 3: Further Examination of EM Signaling/EM 
Performance/Firm Performance Relationships 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores relationships between EM signaling and additional 
performance measures for both environmental and financial performance. While primary 
performance measures defined for this study and reported in the previous chapter are EM 
image or reputation for environmental performance, Newsweek data also contains two 
additional environmental performance measures, i.e., Impact and Policy. Impact measure 
comes closest to grading a firm’s environmental footprint while the Policy measure is an 
assessment of the overall EM posture to include environmental stewardship and 
management of environmental issues. Analysis on the impact from rivalry on reputation 
is replicated with these two additional environmental performance measures.  
For financial performance, besides ROA, data was also collected on a measure of 
earnings per share, and year-to-year growth was calculated as the increase in sales over 
the previous year.  The impact from EM rivalry is assessed using these two additional 
financial performance measures.  
Finally, an analysis of the impact of environmental performance as a mediator 
between EM signaling and financial performance is also conducted to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the drivers of financial performance in the EM domain. 
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Additional environmental performance measures 
Besides environmental reputation of focal firms, the Newsweek data set also 
reports an environmental impact score and a green policies score. From the description of 
the measure, Impact score is based on quantitative performance measures that take into 
account several key variables such as greenhouse gas emissions, water use, carbon 
footprint, solid waste etc. A final derived score is reported as an environmental impact 
score based on proprietary models used by the firms partnering to produce the Newsweek 
rankings. The impact score offers a quantitative opportunity to test if words are being put 
to action. Policy score is reported to be based on an analytical assessment of the firm’s 
policies. The policy score also captures regulatory infractions and lawsuits. The measure 
generates interest as a possible assessment of how environmental signaling impacts a 
firm’s policy posture and limits damages from infractions. The tests used for assessing 
the impact of EM signaling on EM reputation in the prior chapter are replicated with 
Impact and Policy scores as dependent variables in order to garner additional insights. 
The same data set is used for testing the relationships by replacing the dependent 
variables as applicable. The results of the replication using the generalized estimating 
equations (GEE) technique are reported in Table 7. 
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Table 7 - Results for additional environmental performance measures 
 
 
It is interesting to note the lack of significance of the Focal Signaling on the Impact 
score. One would have expected that higher levels of environmental signals, acting as a 
proxy for EM activity at a firm, would lead to a better Impact score. In line with 
competitive dynamics outcomes, we notice a negative and significant impact of Rival 
Signaling and Signaling Dissimilarity on Impact. A possible explanation for this result 
lies in the fact that the focal firm is lagging in its industry thereby getting a lower Impact 
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score. The results for Signaling Dissimilarity on Impact score follow the prior discussions 
around legitimacy with a negative and significant effect raising questions around the 
legitimacy of firm’s signals. For the Policy results, the significance of Focal Signaling (β 
= 0.013, p ≤ 0.05) is not surprising. Higher level of EM signals should expectedly 
articulate a sustainable policy and posture of the firm. One would have expected a 
significant negative effect of Rival Signaling if higher levels of rival signaling could be 
construed as the focal firm playing catch-up, but that cannot be established from the 
above set of results. The significance of Signaling Dissimilarity (β = -0.068, p ≤ 0.05) 
follows prior arguments around legitimacy of actions. An extreme dissimilarity would 
likely accrue negative points toward a final policy score. 
 
Additional financial performance measures 
As discussed earlier, Porter (1991) emphasizes that the impact of environmental activity 
is felt either through cost savings or increased revenue. Recurring savings should result in 
sustained long term shareholder value. In the prior chapter, ROA, which is a short run 
financial measure lends credence to arguments around cost savings from going green. To 
test the long term improvement in shareholder value, a measure of earnings per share is 
used as the dependent variable assessing the impact of EM signaling. EPSPI data from 
Compustat is used as a measure for earning per share. 
The arguments around increased revenue are further augmented by the discussion 
around uncontested markets by Kim and Mauborgne (2005). They present a “blue ocean 
strategy” for creating new uncontested markets. The authors argue that instead of 
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competing head to head in the “red ocean”, where the competitors currently exist, it is 
better to look at uncontested markets for expansion. Based on Porter’s (1991) comments, 
green could present one such uncontested market space for firms to expand. To test the 
possibility of increased revenue from EM, a measure for year-to-year growth (YTYG) is 
developed as the increase in sales over the previous year. The results of replicating the 
ROA model with YTYG, and EPSPI are presented in Table 8. 
 




While we get similar results in terms of significance of variables on EPSPI as on 
ROA, we do not get similar significance with YTYG. The results seem to validate our 
earlier findings with ROA and lends credence to Porter’s (1991) contention of better 
performance through cost savings. The results also seem to suggest a long term of 
positive effect of EM initiatives undertaken by firms. There is a lack of support for the 
year-to-year growth in the dataset used for the above analysis. 
 
Environmental performance as a mediator 
In this section, we extend the findings of Chapter 2 to assess the impact of 
environmental performance on financial performance. The findings in the previous 
chapter establish significant relationships between EM signaling and both environmental 
and financial performance. For a comprehensive understanding of the interactions 
between EM signaling, environmental performance, and financial performance we look at 
a mediated model to test out the various relationships with environmental performance 
mediating the impact of EM signaling on financial performance. 
Based on prior work (Shane and Cable, 2002) with non-financial performance 
measure, a mediating model with environmental performance mediating the relationship 
between EM signaling and financial performance is considered suitable. Shane and Cable 
(2002) look at the entrepreneur’s reputation as a mediating variable that investors use to 
overcome the information asymmetry of the quality of an entrepreneur. The authors argue 
that reputation will mediate the impact of any direct social ties or “private information” 
between investor and entrepreneur since the social tie will generate little additional 
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information about the entrepreneur. I take a similar logic for positing environmental 
performance variables as a mediator between environmental signaling and financial 
performance. EM Reputation, Policy, and Impact should act as the mechanisms for 
overcoming information asymmetry mitigating the relevance of the firm signal. The 
framework for this study is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Mediation model for assessing the impact of environmental performance 
 
In accordance with the mediation model depicted in Figure 2, it is expected that 
the environmental performance variables will provide the indirect path for the impact of 
EM signaling on financial performance. 
 
Sample, data and variables 
Newsweek data for the period of 2009-2012 is used to identify firms with 
associated environmental performance measures. Financial data for the firms in the 
dataset is collected from Compustat. This dataset is subsequently matched with the EM 








Finally, environmental performance and EM signaling data is lagged by a year to the 
financial performance data resulting in a dataset of 2433 records. Table 9 provides the 
descriptive statistics on this dataset. 
 
Table 9 – Descriptive statistics for the mediation model 
 
 
We notice that the average firm had $25,800 million in annual sales and operates 
in a moderately concentrated market (mean market concentration = 1530). Both Firm 
Size and Market Concentration are logged in the model. The aggregate reputation score, 
impact score, and policy scores are standardized. Table 10 reports the bivariate 
correlations for the variables of interest.  
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Table 10 – Bivariate correlations for the mediation model 
 
 
The only correlation of interest are Focal Signaling and Reputation, and Focal 
Signaling and Policy. The correlation matrix does not highlight any multicollinearity 
concerns. 
 
Empirical analysis and results 
Given the unbalanced panel dataset with focal-rival dyads across years, we use 
the generalized estimation equation (GEE) technique for the same reasons as described in 
Chapter 2.  To test mediation from environmental performance variables, Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) three step approach is used as depicted in Figure 3. In Model-1, the 
mediating environmental performance variable is regressed against the independent 
variable, EM signal. In Model-2, the dependent variable, ROA, is regressed against the 
independent variable, EM signal. Finally, in Model-3, the dependent variable, ROA, is 
regressed against both the independent variable and the mediating variable. As per this 
approach a significant relationship should be established in both Model-1 and Model-2. 
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To establish full mediation, Model-3 should result in a significant relationship between 
the mediating variable and the dependent variable, while reporting a lack of significance 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Baron and Kenny (1986) model for testing mediation 
 
Furthermore, as advocated by the authors, when there is correlation between the 
independent variable and the mediating variable, as is the case with Focal Signal-Focal 
Reputation and Focal Signal-Focal Policy it is important to compare both the size and 
significance of the independent variable between Model-2 and Model-3. For the 
application of this approach, environmental performance variables (Reputation, Impact, 


















methodology to test for mediation. The results with Reputation as the mediating variable 
are reported in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 – Results for the Reputation mediation model 
 
 
Based on the results in Table 11, it can be see that Focal Signaling has a positive 
and significant association with Reputation in Model-1. A positive and significant 
association between Focal Signaling and ROA is noticed in Model-2. It is also observed 
that the introduction of Reputation in Model-3 results in a slight reduction in the 
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significance as well as the size of the Focal Signaling coefficient along with a marginal 
significance of the Reputation variable on ROA. This suggests a partial mediation from 
the introduction of Reputation in Model-3. Next, the results with Impact as the mediating 
variable are reported in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 – Results for the Impact mediation model 
 
 
Based on the results in Table 12, we see that Focal Signaling lacks a significant 
association with Impact in Model-1 violating the prerequisites of a mediating model. The 
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positive and significant association between Focal Signaling and ROA has already been 
established. The introduction of Impact in Model-3 does not affect the Focal Signaling on 
ROA, but there is a positive and significant association of the Impact variable with ROA. 
The results suggest an independent effect of both the independent and mediating variable 
on ROA. Next, the results with Policy as the mediating variable are reported in Table 13. 
 




Based on the results in Table 13, we find that Focal Signaling has a significant 
and positive association with Policy. With the association between Focal Signaling and 
ROA already established, the introduction of Policy in Model-3 results in a slight 
reduction in the significance as well as the size of the Focal Signaling coefficient. The 
results also show a marginal significance of the Policy variable. The reduction in size and 
significance of the coefficient of Focal Signaling along with a marginal significance of 
Policy suggests a partial mediation from the introduction of Policy in Model-3. Based on 
the above results, the direct effect of EM signals on financial performance is reinforced. 
Although the marginal significance of Reputation and Policy serve as an important 
reminder for firms to maintain and environmentally friendly posture, the real impact is 
realized from the Impact score suggesting the need for meaningful investments in EM. 
Compared with prior studies that have found a significant relationship between firm 
reputation and financial performance (Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Basdeo et al., 2006), 
the relationship finds partial support in the EM context. 
 
Discussions 
The intent of this chapter was twofold. The first objective was to gain additional 
insights on the impact on performance with a larger set of performance measures, both 
environmental and financial. The second objective was to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the dynamics amongst EM signaling, environmental performance, and 
financial performance through the use of a mediating model.  
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The results from the use of an expanded set of performance measure highlights 
some inconsistencies in terms of the impact on performance from EM signaling as a 
proxy for EM activity. First, the lack of significance in the relationship between EM 
signaling and Impact is surprising. One would have expected higher levels of EM 
signaling resulting in improvement such as reduced GHGs, reduced water consumption 
etc. for an improved Impact score. Second, it has been articulated that going green could 
possibly serve the dual objective of increased revenue and increased efficiency (Porter, 
1991). While the study do find a short term and long term shareholder value perspective 
from EM lending support to the cost savings argument, it does not find support for a 
growth perspective. Given that the dataset conforms to a period of sluggish economic 
activity, it is difficult to definitively interpret the outcome with growth as the dependent 
variable. 
In line with studies that have established financial return from firm reputation 
(Roberts and Dowling, 2002), the results from the mediating model with Reputation 
support, albeit a marginal impact of environmental reputation. Though not as strong, the 
finding is still significant. A similar argument can be made for the marginal significance 
observed in terms of the impact of the policy measure. Firms with a better environmental 
policy score do seem to have better financial results. . The main result from this analysis 
was not the lack of a mediating, but rather the significant direct effect of the Impact 
measure on financial performance. In summary, the results do indicate the importance of 
making meaningful investments in green initiatives.  
As a robustness check, the procedure introduced by Sobel (1982) to test for 
mediation was also performed with the same dataset. Though Baron and Kenny (1986) is 
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the most prevalent testing methodology in OM literature, alternative methodologies have 
been applied as well, specially the Sobel test (Malhotra et al., 2014). A central criticism 
of the Baron and Kenny methodology is the requirement of an overall effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable without controlling for the mediating 
variable.  It has been pointed out that the emphasis should be on the relationship between 
the mediating variable and the dependent variable when a mediating relationship has been 
hypothesized. It has been shown that the Baron and Kenny requirement can lead to 
misleading results if the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable differs in sign from the indirect effect through the mediating variable on the 
dependent variable (Malhotra et al., 2014). While this is not a big concern given that the 
predicted direct and indirect paths of influence are hypothesized to have a similar positive 
effect on financial performance, for the sake of robustness, Sobel test is done for 
assessing mediation from the environmental performance on financial performance. As a 
specialized t-test, Sobel test allows to assess if the indirect effect of the mediation effect 
is significant based on the size and standard error of the coefficient. Table 14 presents the 
results of the Sobel testing with all three environmental performance variables as 




Table 14 – Results from Sobel test for mediation 
 
 
The above results are nearly identical to the results obtained with the Baron and 
Kenny approach. Both Reputation and Policy are marginally significant (one-tailed) 
suggesting partial mediation, but there is no such support for the Impact variable as a 
mediator. 
Beyond the results of the mediation test, the lack of significance of EM signaling 
on Impact resurrects the arguments around greenwashing. While this cannot be 
definitively ascertained without a careful analysis of the CSR reports, the results do 
highlight continued concerns. 
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Conclusion 
Much has been said about greenwashing and the fact that companies like to claim 
the green label without really investing the effort or resources. While we cannot debunk 
such a proposition, the stronger association of Impact on financial performance is 
encouraging. The data does seem to support genuine efforts by the firm even if firms are 
engaging in some level of greenwashing. Though, from a managerial perspective, it is 
important to research how firms are overcoming the information asymmetry aspect of 
EM. Are some taking undue advantage by creating a perception of reality?  
As a next step, this work can be built upon by leveraging signaling theory to 
better understand the impact of environmental signals. The impact from signaling through 
CSRs is dual, it should improve the firm’s operational performance as well as improve its 
reputation. In terms of parsing out the impact of signaling further between these dual 
impacts, additional research is required in assessing the quality and intent of a firm 
signal. A significant body of work exists in signaling that deals with credible signaling 
(Kirmani and Rao, 2000) that can be leveraged to classify signals for further investigation 
of this topic. 
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Chapter 4: Competitive Dynamics and Inter-firm Rivalry 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to expanding the prior work done by Hofer et al. (2012) 
on inter-firm rivalry in the EM domain. In chapters 2 and 3, the same basic measure for 
focal and competitive behavior established by Hofer et al. (2012) was used to test out the 
various relationships. In this chapter, we attempt to add richness to the set of competitive 
dynamic measures while at the same time expanding the set of rivals.   
Inter-firm rivalry as evidenced by actions and counteractions of firms and rivals 
has been reported in multiple studies (Young et al., 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999). Hofer et al. 
(2012) found evidence of this recurring phenomenon in the EM domain as well by 
restricting their focus to a measure of total volume of activities by a firm as gleaned from 
the CSR reports. The authors leveraged Schumpeterian economics and signaling theory 
as the theoretical underpinning for studying EM from a competitive dynamics 
perspective. The Schumpeterian viewpoint has been elaborated in Chapter 2. The 
following section provides a recap of signaling theory as applicable to the current study. 
 
Signaling Theory 
According to Spence (2002), signaling theory is essentially concerned with 
reducing information asymmetry between two parties. In this respect, studies have looked 
at price as a signal of quality (Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 
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1986), CEO stature providing credibility to the financial statement of the firm (Zhang and 
Wieserma, 2009) etc. Given that many of the activities a firm undertakes are hidden from 
the consumers as well as competitors, signaling theory provides a suitable basis for 
studying EM behavior in the context of competitive dynamics. In the context of this 
study, a central question is the definition of a signal.  
According to Porter (1980), market signal is any action by a firm that provides 
direct or indirect indication about its intentions, motives, goals, or internal situation. He 
broadly classifies signals as both preannouncements of market action (intent); and market 
actions, thereby providing an expanded basis to study inter-firm competition. Besides 
signals emanating from the firm itself, studies have also looked at signals (awards, 
competitive ranking etc.) that convey information about the firm through external 
monitors (Fombrum and Shanley, 1990; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). Heil and 
Robertson (1991) borrow from Porter’s (1980) expanded definition of signal, but nuance 
it from the perspective of the signal sender. Whereas Porter’s (1980) signals are focused 
on interpretation of actions by the receiver, Heil and Robertson (1991), shifts the focus to 
the signal sender  by acknowledging that a signal not received can be attributed to a failed 
signal. This nuance assumes importance in this study since it is difficult to measure 
reception of EM signals. Signaling theory relies on the observability of market signals 
that allows competitors to respond. The theory forms the basis for two distinct 
components that apply to competitive dynamics: 1) the signal is what conveys a firm’s 
intent, and 2) it is observable, as in, is detectable by sensory systems of other firms as per 
their scanning capabilities (Smith et al., 2001). The aforementioned theoretical basis of 
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our work is similar to the approach adopted by Hofer et al. (2012) with the difference 
being that this study relies on Heil and Robertson’s (1991) definition of a market signal. 
 
Hypotheses 
As argued by Smith et al. (2001), a firm and its set of competitors share a level of 
interdependence as they feel the impact of actions taken by others and interact through 
their own moves and countermoves. A firm’s effort to improve upon their performance at 
the cost of others depends on the action of others as well.  Based on the Schumpeterian 
discourse, the markets are never in a state of static equilibrium in the presence of 
competition. Entrepreneurial actions by firms and their rivals are constantly eroding the 
status quo as they take actions to improve upon their performance. A majority of these 
actions can be generally classified as: pricing actions, marketing actions, new product 
actions, capacity-and-scale related actions, service and operations actions, signaling 
actions, etc. (Smith et al, 2001). In the context of green, Hofer et al. (2012) look at the 
interactions between leader-challenger pairs and find evidence of rival EM activity as a 
driver of the leader’s EM activity.  The study looks at firm and rival competitive activity 
between leader and challenger firms in the US within a specific 6 digit NAICS. The 
authors find that higher levels of rival competitive activities lead to higher levels of focal 
firm activity in the EM domain. 
This study builds on the work of Hofer et al., (2012), by leveraging Heil and 
Robertson’s (1991) viewpoint and looks at the competitive interplay amongst firms via 
signals. Heil and Robertson (1991) have adopted Porter’s (1980) definition of signals as 
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market actions as well as preannouncement of market actions, but anchor the intentions 
of the signal from the sender’s perspective. This study also adopts arguments by 
Fombrum and Shanley (1990) to include signals about firms sent by external monitors 
(awards, ratings etc.).  
To bolster the competitive dynamics viewpoint of action and reaction, this study 
also incorporates Heil and Robertson’s (1991) argument on pre-emption as a reason for 
competitive market signaling by firms. By signaling intent, a firm conveys its 
commitment to a set of actions, and the necessary steps it is willing or undertaking to 
bring that intent to fruition. These could include: locking in suppliers, locking in 
customers via forward booking, building capacity, announcing new technology etc. In 
doing so, the signaling firm might discourage competitors from following as long as the 
signal is credible, as in, it should convey a high level of commitment from the signaler. 
The pre-emption argument seemingly favors strong credible signals and complements the 
support for inter-firm rivalry resulting from interdependence in the context of competitive 
dynamics. Viewed in tandem, the two approaches suggest that not only would a firm 
counter rivals’ signals, but would also send a stronger signal back to discourage pursuit. 
Given the theoretical underpinnings and prior research in competitive dynamics, 
the impact of competitor behavior on focal firm behavior is captured via an inter-firm 
rivalry model as depicted in Figure 4. It is expected that given the interdependencies and 
with the intent to pre-empt firms would respond forcefully to counter competitive moves 
by their rivals. As with other types of actions such as pricing or advertising, higher levels 
of rival signaling in the EM domain would lead to a higher level of signaling response 
from the focal firm. Besides a higher level of signaling, firms also compete aggressively 
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through a broader range of actions (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Borrowing from the work by 




Figure 4 – Signaling rivalry model 
 
By leveraging arguments on firm level interdependence as well as a desire to pre-empt, 
the competitive interaction among firms in the green domain is formally proposed as the 
following: 
 
H6a: A higher level of environmental signals from its competitors leads to a higher level 
of environmental signals by the focal firm. 
 
H6b: A higher level of signaling complexity from its competitors leads to a higher level of 









Sample, data, and variables 
In support of the study for Chapter 2, a data frame of 582 unique firms across the 
four years of Newsweek data with their top three rivals identified through Hoover’s was 
established. The CSR collection and subsequent content analysis resulted in EM signaling 
data ranging from 2008 to 2011. To study the relationship between rival and focal 
signaling, we lag the rival signals (2008-2010) by a year to focal signals (2009-2011). 
Additional filters are subsequently applied to create the inter-firm signaling dataset. The 
data used for assessing inter-firm rivalry is restricted to ensure rivalry by filtering where 
both focal and rival record signals in the year of impact with either reporting in the 
lagged year of relevance. For the study of inter-firm rivalry, we use both actual thematic 
scores as well as a binary coding of themes (1 if significant, 0 otherwise) for deriving the 
various competitive dynamic measures. Consistent with prior work (Hofer et al., 2012), 
we assign a zero signal value to firms that either do not report significant activity or do 
not report at all. 
 
Measurement of variables 
In addition to the total volume of signaling, signaling complexity is also calculated 
for assessing inter-firm rivalry. The importance of complexity is noted in several studies 
(Ferrier et al., 1999; Nodofor et al., 2012) as a driver of improved performance. To 
expand the prior work of Hofer et al. (2012), a measure of complexity is included and 
researched within the same modeling framework depicted by Figure 3. The methodology 
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for measuring total signaling is elaborated in Chapter 2. For signaling complexity, we use 
the Montabon et al. (2007) categorization for EM signals and is measured as below: 
1. Signal complexity: adopted from Ferrier et al. (1999) measures the dispersion in 
signaling across the different categories of the Montabon et al. (2007) typology. It 
measures if signals are spread across operational, tactical, and strategic or 




2)/( , where 
 i - signal category (operational, tactical, strategic) 
NT – total amount of signaling for the respective focal or rival 
  
Besides measures of focal and rival signaling, various industry level controls are 
included in the model for studying inter-firm rivalry. Measures of competitive behavior 
are lagged by a year to the measures of focal firm signals, with ROA, Sales, HHI and 
Industry dummies used as controls. ROA, Sales and HHI are used as proxies for 
profitability, firm size, and market concentration respectively for the same reasons of 
firm flexibility, investment potential, and signal reception cited in chapter 2. The 




Table 15 – Descriptive statistics for signaling rivalry score model 
 
 
Table 16 lists the correlations among the different variables. The only correlations 
of significance are the expected ones between measure of total signal and signaling 
complexity.  
 
Table 16 – Bivariate correlations for the signaling rivalry score model 
 
 
Given the possibility that minor differences in theme scores does not convey 
much in terms of differences in firm signals, a 1/0 coding is used as in Chapter 2 to 
account for the significance of a theme. This follows the logic from the Hofer et al. 
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(2012) paper of assigning a significant theme a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The same 
dataset used for measuring signal score is also used for calculating signal count as 
described above along with measures for complexity. The descriptive statistics for the 
different variables based on counts is provided in Table 17. An over-dispersion in the 
dependent variable Focal Signals is noticeable.  
 
Table 17 – Descriptive statistics for signaling rivalry count model 
 
 
Table 18 lists the correlations among the different variables using significant 




Table 18 – Bivariate correlations for the signaling rivalry count model 
 
 
As with correlation with data on signal scores, Competitor Complexity and 
Competitor Signal; and focal Complexity and Focal Signal are highly correlated. Since 
complexity and total signal are not used in the same model, there are no multicollinearity 
concerns from the above correlations. 
 
Empirical analysis and results 
Estimation methodology 
Generalized linear modeling techniques are employed for assessing the impact of 
competitive signaling on focal firm response. The impact of inter-firm rivalry is assessed 
using both scores and counts. A negative binomial regression is used for counts because 
of over dispersion in the Focal Signal count variable. Separate models are run for 
assessing rivalry along signaling complexity and total signaling. The regression models 
are constructed as below: 




Xt – Focal Signal or Signal Complexity at time t 
XCt-1 – Competitor Signal or Signal Complexity lagged by 1 year 
Salest-1 – Focal sales (Size) lagged by 1 year 
HHIt-1 – Focal HHI (Market Concentration) lagged by 1 year 
ROAt-1 – Focal ROA (Profitability) lagged by 1 year 
Industryd – Industry dummies 
The study tests the impact of lagged competitor signaling on focal firm signaling 
while controlling for lagged focal firm signaling, focal firm size (lagged), focal firm 
profitability (lagged), focal firm’ industry concentration (lagged), as well any fixed 
effects of the focal firm industry. These models are run with both signal score and signal 
counts. Given the non-normality and over-dispersion of focal firm signal counts, a 
negative binomial generalized linear model is used for testing the relationships. All 
statistical tests in this chapter are performed using R.  
 
Empirical results 
Since the dataset conforms to a time series cross sectional (TSCS) set with few 
time periods and an unbalanced panel, OLS regressions using generalized linear models 
(GLM) are performed to assess the strength of the hypothesized relationships. Dynamic 
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linear modeling technique is employed via inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in 
the model to account for autocorrelation. Results from the GLM regressions performed in 
R using the total signaling score and signal complexity are presented in Table 19.   
Table 19 – Results for the signaling rivalry score model 
 
 
The regression results using total signaling based on counts and signaling 
complexity based on counts is presented in Table 20. 
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Table 20 – Results for the signaling rivalry count model 
 
 
Hypothesis testing results 
Hypothesis 6a states that higher level of competitor signaling will lead to higher levels of 
focal response. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for Competitor 
Signaling (lagged) using both scores (β = 0.089, p ≤ 0.05) and count model (β = 0.012, p 
≤ 0.05) as reported in Table 19 and Table 20 provides evidence in support of hypothesis 
6a. But the lack of significance of Competitor Complexity (lagged) fails to provide 
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support for hypothesis 6b, which stated that greater complexity of competitor signaling 
will elicit a greater complexity of focal response. 
 
Conclusion 
The intent of this section was to build on the prior work of Hofer et al. (2012). 
While similar results are obtained in terms of the competitive dynamics between firms, 
additional competitive dynamic measures calculated for this study are unable to provide 
further insights into EM rivalry between firms. Nevertheless, competitive dynamic 
literature has documented several ways to look at rivalry and more needs to be done for a 
thorough understanding of rivalry between firms in the EM domain. Given the anecdotal 
evidence as reported in the media such as the “bottle wars” to introduce bioplastics in 
water bottles, or recyclable paper in coffee cups, competitive dynamic measures such as 
action timing, and scope (limited introduction or introduction in all markets) provide a 
rich basis to further the research on inter-firm rivalry in the EM domain.  
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Chapter 5: Additional Analysis – Advantage Supplier 
 
Introduction 
 “Currently, 48 percent of firms reward suppliers with good sustainability 
practices or jointly improve processes with suppliers that do not. About 44 percent of 
firms measure the sustainability performance of major suppliers, and 24 percent require 
a third party to certify suppliers’ sustainability practices.” – Mahler (2007) 
 
The importance of the supplier network has been emphasized by Rice and Hoppe 
(2001). In their view supplier networks and the capabilities companies can cultivate via 
their supplier network will play a dominant role in competing successfully. Mahler 
(2007) further notes that in terms of trends there is an expectation of more joint 
participation with suppliers to improve sustainability processes, track sustainability 
metrics, and more external certification of suppliers. A careful analysis of the CSR 
reports indicates the importance firms place on a supplier code of conduct around 
sustainable practices. Given the highly outsourced nature of business nowadays, 
achieving green has to be an all-inclusive effort receiving support from every member of 
the supply chain.  With the supplier network becoming a source of competitive 
advantage, the above viewpoints make a strong case to look at EM contributions from the 
suppliers to the firm’s performance. The following section details the current state of 




The relational view by Dyer and Singh (1998) advocates the advantages firms 
might reap from resources outside firm boundaries to include suppliers and other alliance 
partners in the network. The strategic importance of suppliers to the success of a firm has 
been explored from several different perspectives. In the study on specialized supplier 
networks as a source of competitive advantage, Dyer (1996) notes that transaction 
specific investments by suppliers could create a source of competitive advantage. The 
relational viewpoint looks at complementary capabilities, knowledge sharing, relation-
specific assets, and effective governance as sources of advantage in the network. Dyer 
and Singh (1998) expand the resource based view of valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources from within firm boundaries to a firm’s network emphasizing the 
importance of suppliers. They have argued that firms who have worked with their 
suppliers to combine resources and capabilities draw a distinct competitive advantage. 
Azadegan et al. (2008) find that firms derive competitive advantages from supplier 
innovativeness. In their work on strategic networks, Gulati et al. (2000) contend that the 
conduct and performance of a firm can be much better understood by examining the 
network of relationships rather than by taking an atomistic view of the firm. For example, 
the tight relationships with its suppliers have often been cited as an example of Toyota’s 
success. As pointed out by Dyer and Singh (1998), the need for cooperation and 
alignment between buyer-suppliers is ever increasing with firms purchasing more and 
more of the value of the product they produce. 
While evidence of improved operational performance from a firm’s supply 
management orientation has been noted by Shin et al. (2000), the results of supplier 
 76
involvement in the EM context require additional research. Based on case studies in the 
furniture industry, Walton et al. (1998) advocate the need of supplier and purchaser 
involvement to lower cost and meet or exceed environmental expectations of 
stakeholders. Greening of the supplier network gets complicated with appropriation of 
financial gains, distribution of costs, and a whole host of issues surrounding boundary 
spanning activities. In a survey based study, Rao (2002) looks at the link between green 
supply chains, and its association to competitive and economic performance. While the 
study did not establish a direct link between green supply chains and economic 
performance, it did find a mediated effect of competitiveness from green activities on 
financial performance. 
By leveraging arguments around the relational view proposed by Dyer and Singh 
(1998) of the supplier network being a unique and valuable resource for the firm, the 
relationship between supplier EM behavior and focal firm performance is formally 
proposed as follows: 
 
H7: Higher levels of environmental signaling by supplier will have a positive effect on 
the performance of the focal firm. 
 
Sample, data, and variables 
For the initial analysis to assess the impact of EM signaling by the supplier 
network on focal firm performance, the focal firms are identified through the Newsweek 
data for which we have existing environmental performance data. As noted earlier, 
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Newsweek publishes green rankings for the top 500 U.S. firms. The rankings from 2009-
2012 covers twenty different industries under a classification system developed by 
Newsweek.   
Identification of suppliers is achieved by leveraging the 3Bloomberg dataset. 
Bloomberg data lists major manufacturing firms as well as a subset of their suppliers. For 
this initial analysis, only direct suppliers are included in the consideration set. Focal firm 
and their suppliers are matched up with the EM dataset already developed for this 
dissertation. Through this matching process a list of 240 focal-supplier dyads are 
generated comprising EM signals, focal firm performance, and data associated with 
control variables (Sales, ROA, and HHI). Table 21 presents the descriptive statistics on 
the initial dataset. The same measures as before are used for the purpose of this analysis.  
Supplier Signaling is the count of significant themes recorded against firms that match up 
as suppliers in the dataset used for performance studies in chapters 2 and 4. 
 
                                                 
3 The Bloomberg data was shared by Isaac Elking and John-Patrick Paraskevas, Ph.D. students at the 
University of Maryland. I would like to note their cooperation in making this data available upon request 
with adequate explanation. 
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Table 21 – Descriptive statistics for the supplier network dataset 
 
 
Logarithms of Focal Size and Market Concentration are used in the models to 
reduce the disparity in the scale of measures. Table 22 presents the correlation table for 
this dataset.  
 





None of the bivariate correlations are indicative of multicollinearity issues in the 
model. One would have expected a positive and significant correlation between Focal 
Signal and Supplier Signal as opposed to the negative and insignificant value noted in 
Table 22. A similar argument could be made for supplier signaling and focal firm ROA, 
which is not the case as reported in Table 22.  
 
Empirical analysis and results 
For similar reasons cited earlier, generalized estimation equation (GEE) 
techniques are employed for assessing the impact of supplier signaling on focal firm 
performance. The impact on focal firm performance is assessed using both Reputation 
and ROA. The regression model is constructed as below: 
Xt Ft-1 St-1 log Salest-1 log HHIt-1 ROAt-1 
 
Where, 
Xt – Focal performance with Reputation or ROA at time t 
Ft-1 – Focal Signal lagged by 1 year 
St-1 – Supplier Signal lagged by 1 year 
Salest-1 – Focal sales (Size) lagged by 1 year 
HHIt-1 – Focal HHI (Market Concentration) lagged by 1 year 
ROAt-1 – Focal ROA (Profitability) lagged by 1 year 
 80
Instead of a dynamic panel model, an autoregressive model is used for testing 
with ROA as the dependent variable. Table 23 presents the results of the GEE analysis. 
 
Table 23 – Empirical results for the impact of supplier signals 
 
 
Based on the results reported in Table 23, Supplier Signal has a positive though 
marginally significant impact on focal firm reputation, but a negative and marginally 
significant impact on financial performance. Though weak, the results provide partial 
support to the hypothesis. 
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Conclusion 
The intent of this study was to look at the impact of the supplier network on firm 
performance in the EM domain by testing the relationship between EM signals from 
suppliers and focal firm performance. Though the results provide mixed and weak 
support for the different performance measures, it does lend support to the notion of the 
importance of the supplier network.  The significance of the marginal significance 
assumes added significance given the limitations of the underlying dataset, which is 
rather restrictive due to the matching of Bloomberg with the existing EM dataset. These 
results do make a case for further investigation of the arguments made by Dyer and Singh 
(1998) that the supplier network comprises unique resources for the firm in line with the 
resource based view.  It also assumes managerial significance in terms of selection and 
management of suppliers. Though it is difficult to make any generalizable claims based 
on a partial dataset used for this analysis, the results provide sufficient indication of the 




Chapter 6: Dissertation Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Future Research 
This section discusses two specific future research extensions laying out feasible 
approaches based on the exploratory work accomplished in these areas.  The first 
extension of the work presented through this dissertation is to expand the exploratory 
analysis on boundary spanning EM activities with the inclusion of supplier EM signals 
discussed in Chapter 5. The future research possibilities look into additional possibilities 
of network analysis from a methodological perspective as well as scope of analysis. 
The second proposed extension is to address issues surrounding greenwashing , 
by looking into aspects of credible signaling. Greenwashing occurs with firms signaling 
EM without substantive follow-up actions or investments to benefit the environment. In 
such a situation the announcements are tantamount to lip service for deriving benefits 
from the cultivation of a false image. The lack of significance of focal firm signals on 
Impact score coupled with a partial mediation effect of Reputation on ROA, as reported in 
Chapter 3, is indicative of this phenomena. Prior work in the area of credible signaling 
provides a platform to further investigate this phenomena. The subsequent paragraphs 




Focusing on methodological extensions for improved datasets, an alternative 
approach would entail the preparation of an entirely new dataset by leveraging 
Bloomberg. Post identification of competitors through Hoover’s for focal firms in 
Bloomberg, one could leverage the Bloomberg dataset to capture environmental data on 
focal, competitor, and supplier firms existing in the Bloomberg dataset. Bloomberg’s 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) data is collected from published company 
material and integrated with the financial products the company offers for investor 
analysis. Bloomberg data reports on some 5000 companies and reports on data such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, waste production etc. ESG disclosure 
scores reported by Bloomberg as an indicator of transparency in the firm’s reporting has 
garnered considerable interest (Eccles et al., 2011). An appropriate disclosure score 
metric in the Bloomberg dataset could be a suitable proxy for EM behavior. 
A more extensive usage of Bloomberg data would also allow investigation on 
additional supplier attributes including: supply chain tier or echelon; relative importance; 
and for some industries the possibility to look at both upstream and downstream EM 
activity.  The data is available for different echelons of the supply chain. For a focal firm 
the database lists direct suppliers and then keeps moving upstream to capture the 
supplier’s supplier. Furthermore, Bloomberg provides the percent of the cost of goods 
sold by the manufacturer that is sourced from the specific supplier thus helping with the 
identification of top suppliers if needed. 
The current EM dataset is limited by both the number of CSR reports and the 
methodology used for harvesting EM signals. To complete this dataset, additional CSR 
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reports can be captured where the existing dataset has gaps for quantifying EM behavior. 
In terms of quantifying EM signals, a simpler codification scheme can be employed for 
content analysis.  The current content analysis methodology employed is restricted by a 
thematic coding scheme. One could leverage prior studies (Aerts and Cormier, 2009) to 
implement a simpler coding scheme for collecting EM information on firms from these 
reports with the expectation of gaining more data. An assessment of the feasibility of 
such an approach was undertaken with a comparable content analysis tool (Atlas.ti) using 
a limited number of CSRs and a few select keywords. The output from Atlas.ti is 
presented in Table 24. 
 
Table 24 – Sample output from Atlas.ti 
 
 
Table 24 records the frequency of words displayed in the first column in the 
columns with the document name (P1-P5). The columns denoted “%” record the 
percentage of occurrence of the specific keyword in the set of all the keywords found in 
the document for a relative importance score. Such an approach could be adopted to test 
key themes recurring in the supply chain network for network level comparisons. 
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Along with an expanded dataset, there are several possible ways to extend the 
work undertaken in this chapter beyond the focal-supplier dyadic analysis. While the 
above study is undertaken to establish the relationship between supplier signals and focal 
firm performance, the dynamics behind performance are typically a bit more complex. 
The focal-supplier context can be extended to research the impact of supplier network in 
the competitive context by collecting data on the competitors and their suppliers. This 
extension can replicate the work performed in chapters 2 and 4 to assess the rivalry 
aspect between focal and rival firms at the network level, and assess the impact of 
network level rivalry on performance. Moving away from the supplier context, one could 
also change the tone of the discussions. Thus far, the discussions have centered on focal 
firms including supplier support for focal firms. The next step would be to look at 
customer driven approaches by looking at focal-customer dyads. Focal-customer 
direction recognizes that the customer’s preference for sustainable behavior could be an 
important driver of EM. For example, P&G’s focus on green could very well be an 
outcome of Walmart’s green strategy. These extensions would serve to provide a 
comprehensive viewpoint on EM initiatives and its outcome by taking into account a 
majority of the stakeholders. 
In summary, expanding this research to include supplier networks as well as 
customers has relevant managerial implications. In terms of the supplier network, given 
the value of the product outsourced to suppliers, and the relevance of suppliers in 
complying with green guidelines, this research stream represents an existing gap in the 
literature. Similarly, the importance of the customer as the driver behind green initiatives 
cannot be ignored. It is important to evolve our understanding of EM behavior by looking 
 86
at the entire supply chain. The initial analysis on the impact of the supplier network does 
look promising and provides a reasonable measure of confidence for an undertaking to 




To further understand the issues surrounding greenwashing, a natural extension is 
to look at credible signaling. Grounded in signaling theory, credibility looks at signal 
quality and cost tradeoffs. Kirmani and Rao (2000) highlight the applicability of the 
theory via a model that includes both a high-quality and a low-quality firm where quality 
is not observable. In this context, the authors explain that high quality firms will 
undertake signaling if the payoff from signaling is higher than from not signaling to 
differentiate from the low quality firm. By assessing the credibility of signals, one can 
better understand the mechanisms by which firms are seeking gains from their greening 
initiatives. The following section details the current efforts in developing this extension 
further. 
A host of studies have looked at the credibility of firm signals (Cohen and Dean, 
2005; Janney and Folta, 2006). These studies have presented attributes such as cost, 
irreversibility, and observability as qualities of good signals with cost itself being a proxy 
for credibility.  In the context of the data employed for research throughout this 
dissertation, it is important to revisit this issue to try and establish the veracity of 
information made available through CSR reports. To establish the importance of this 
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topic, the following section reviews the theory and a select set of papers looking at the 
quality of EM signals. 
Signaling theory has been extensively used in business settings to understand firm 
behavior vis-à-vis its rivals, and potential for payoffs based on signals (Heil and 
Robertson, 1991; Basdeo et al, 2006; Connelly et al., 2011). Signaling is typically 
undertaken to convey an unobservable quality of the firm as well as to educate the 
stakeholders on intent of a course of action (Stiglitz, 2000). As noted by Connelly et al. 
(2011), the depth of the theory lies in “ascribing costs to the information acquisition 
process that resolves information asymmetry.” This aspect was highlighted in Spence’s 
(1973) formulation of the theory. In the context of a labor market, Spence (1973) explains 
the importance of educational accomplishment as a signal of quality sent by a candidate 
to a prospective employer.  
In the EM domain, the focus shifts on qualifying a signal as credible. Montabon et 
al. (2000) find some evidence of performance improvements from ISO 14000 
certification. Similar to ISO 9000 for quality, ISO 14000 is awarded based on a third 
party audit of firm level EM practices. While this study lends partial support to Porter’s 
(1991) argument of performance improvement through adoption of environmental 
standards, it leaves the question open on the possible indirect effects from an ISO 14000 
certification. ISO 14000 does inform the consumers and competitors of the firm’s 
friendly green posture, but by doing so, does the firm reap some additional benefits over 
and above its rivals lacking such a certification? In that sense is ISO 14000 a credible 
signal? 
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To advance the research around credibility of signals in the EM domain, the 
following ways of assessing credibility are proposed at different levels including: 1) one 
could assess the overall credibility of the CSR report; 2) one could assess the credibility 
of portions of the report; and 3) one could assess the credibility of individual statements 
or disclosures in a report. Table 25 presents the analysis of a representative CSR report. 
 
Table 25 – Sample analysis of a CSR report for assessing credibility 
 
 
The structure of the above analysis supports the aforementioned approaches of 
assessing credibility. Elements of a CSR report such as external validation of the report, 
conformity with an internationally recognized reporting standard could be used for 
assessing the overall credibility of the report. Alternatively, one could also limit the focus 
to the CEO or Leadership statement of the report and parse the content to assign an 
overall EM score based on the content analysis of the CEO statement. In AMJ 
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Proceedings (2013), Nadkarni et al. present their findings on speed of competitive actions 
based on CEO orientation. They analyze the tense of CEO statements to assess their 
orientation in terms of an emphasis on past activities or a futuristic perspective to assess 
timing of competitive moves. A similar approach can be applied to analyze leadership 
statements included in CSR reports in terms of achievement versus promises and the 
impact on performance.  
The final approach advocated for assessing credibility relies on a careful analysis 
of individual statements. The approach can be segmented by effort into an automated 
software based track or a manual coding track. In the automated track, software based 
keyword or a key phrase search can be deployed using a list of keywords or phrases that 
signify credible signaling such as ISO 14000. ISO 14000 can be construed as a costly 
signal because of the resources a firm has to invest in getting certified. But, besides the 
costly therefore credible paradigm, associating with the ISO institution is an attempt by 
the firm to seek credibility from an institutional intermediary (Aerts and Cormier, 2009). 
A similar argument can be made in terms of conforming to reporting standards of 
institutions such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), or reporting to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP). By participating in recognized institutions a firm can signal 
credibility. The above credibility seeking approaches can be leveraged for content 
analysis of reports for analysis. In the more manual approach, pledges made by the firms 
can be tracked over a period of time, as depicted in Table 25, and coded to assign a 
credibility based on the percent of completion. One could also adopt the methodology 
used by Aerts and Cormier (2009) and assign a relative score to disclosures in the CSR 
report depending on whether the disclosure is quantified, is specific, or general.  
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In summary, the aforementioned approaches can be used for pursuing the credible 
aspects of environmental reporting to assess the impact of reporting credibility as an 
independent variable. The feasibility of the approaches above is validated from a careful 
analysis of the CSR reports and prior research in this area. The elements of a CSR report 
do support a push to look at the credibility of EM reporting and assessing the impact of 
such reporting on performance in a competitive framework. With theoretical support, this 
undertaking would better explain firm behavior and its impact on performance. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation takes a comprehensive look at the EM domain within the 
competitive dynamics framework merged with complementary viewpoints to explain 
firm level EM behavior and the impact on performance. The study builds on the prior 
work by Hofer et al. (2012) and extends their work by assessing the impact of rivalry on 
performance. Similar to prior studies, the study finds a direct impact of EM behavior on 
EM performance (Zhu and Sarkis, 2002) with sound theoretical support. The study also 
articulates the importance of reputation building. Prior studies have pointed at reputation 
being a valuable resource for the firm that cannot be easily imitated (Roberts and 
Dowling, 2000). This notion is validated in the EM context through the partial mediation 
of EM reputation on ROA. Contrary to prior work (Rao, 2002), this study finds a direct 
impact of EM behavior on financial performance. In a surprising result, the study also 
finds a positive and significant impact of competitive activity on focal firm performance 
emphasizing the institutional effects of being green.  
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The dissertation also attempts to answer the call for network level analysis. An 
existing gap in the literature is the network level analysis of EM behavior. Given the 
relational viewpoint advocated by Dyer and Singh (1998), and the practicalities of 
outsourcing, it is important to extend research to boundary spanning activities. While a 
thorough investigation is not accomplished in this dissertation, the preliminary analysis 
using focal-supplier dyads is encouraging and provides a feasible roadmap for this 
undertaking. 
Finally, the results make a case for advancing the need for EM research 
surrounding credibility. The varying impact of EM behavior on different environmental 
performance measures highlights the need for additional research in this area. While the 
lack of significance of EM behavior on Impact suggests greenwashing, the significant 
impact of Impact on ROA is encouraging. These results call for further research on the 







Chapter 2 captures the data preparation activities at a high level. Additional details are 
provided below with a reproduction of the thematic identification process conducted by 
Hofer, Cantor, and Dai (2012) that has been reused for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Following their approach, for the first part of our thematic analysis approach using the 
centered resonance technique in Crawdad, 250 common keywords with the highest 
influence scores are generated. The network analysis places more influential words in the 
center of the network and assigns them an influence score. The parameters were set so 
that these words appeared in at least two-thirds of the files used for this study. Several 
other combinations requesting a higher number of keywords commonly occurring in 
more or less number of files analyzed were tested to obtain the optimal set of keywords 
across all the 1276 files analyzed. A request for more than 250 keywords introduced a 
substantial volume of prepositions and conjunctions in the output. A very high degree of 
commonality reduced the number of common words to a handful. Besides influence 
scores of keywords, Crawdad also reports on the strength of the keyword combinations 
via keyword correlation matrix. The correlation is indicative of co-occurrence of text, 
which allows for the generation of themes and further thematic analysis. Next, we reuse 
the themes generated by Hofer et al. (2012) to quantify EM signals. As noted by the 
authors (p.81) “A top-down approach was then used to filter out the relevant themes that 
best identify the 33 EM activities defined by Montabon et al. (2007). Through this 
process, a set of 314 themes (i.e. positively correlated keyword combinations) 
representing the 33 EM activities was identified.” The following steps were executed to 
reuse the themes from the prior Hofer et al. (2012) study: 
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1. Generate 250 keywords using Crawdad, 
2. Harvest all the positively correlated keyword pairs using Crawdad’s output, and 
3. Match the keyword pairs with the 314 themes (keyword pairs) used in the Hofer, 
Cantor, Dai (2012) study 
The above steps resulted in 107 thematic matches by reusing themes from the prior study. 
The top 10 themes based on the matching process as recorded across the 1276 CSR 
reports analyzed is presented in Table 26. 
 
Table 26 – Top Ten Themes 
 
 
As recorded in Table 26, based on the CSR reports analyzed, the theme environmental 
management appeared in approximately 76% of the reports, while the theme 
environmental standard appeared in about 18% of the reports.  
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